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CHALLENGE!
For the past 6 months, much of our
attention has been devoted to the
energy crisis. Some Americans have
realized for the first time that seemingly
boundless energy resources really do
have limits, both physical and political.
We have been reminded that even super
powers live in a small, interdependent
world. As evidenced during the recent
oil embargo, small and distant countries
in that world have the means to disrupt
and change our way of life.
Messrs. Blechman and Kuzmack, in
the thought-provoking article "Oil and
National Security," in this issue of the
Review, explore the many sides to this
problem. They conclude that stock
piling is the best alternative to insure
against future interruptions of our
needed oil supplies and carefully detail
how this could be accomplished.
But what of the military? Can the
military contribute anything to the reso
lution of this largely economic issue?
Can the availability and display of mili
tary force prevent other nations from
taking actions inimical to our interests,
or doesn't this work any more? Is
military action an acceptable means of
forcing the removal of nonbelligerent
embargoes or sanctions? Would stock
piling necessary raw materials be prefer
able to an equivalent investment in
military forces? What of the inflexibility

of the stockpiling solution in light of
changing circumstances versus the alter
native uses of military forces?
Whatever the answers to these ques
tions, it is incumbent on those of us in
uniform to understand what Blechman
and Kuzmack have to say. It is also
important that we understand what
part, if any, military force can play in
solving this national problem. Presence
forces can be a subtle, effective instru
ment of diplomacy when understood
and used adroitly. However, it is my
belief that the use of presence forces is
not fully appreciated by the military. In
addition, their potential effectiveness in
low order contingency actions is largely
neglected. Hopefully, the immediacy
and shock of the energy crisis and
articles like this one will stimulate us to
probe more deeply into these areas.
Discussion of this subject presages
the annual Current Strategy Forum
we11 be hosting again in June. This year
the whole problem of resource scarcities
will be examined in support of the
theme: "Resource Scarcity as a Possible
Source of Future Conflict?"
Additionally, the need for deeper
understanding of this type of politico
military problem highlights the impor
tance of continuing research into naval
theory. The War College has an Ad
vanced Research Program. A few stu-
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Admiral Richard G. Colbert
U.S. Navy

1915-1973

"Traditionally and historically, the
Naval War College has been the foun
tainhead of new concepts, doctrines,
and ideas within our Navy. In the face
of the challenge that confronts us, I
would hope that 'on my watch' we will
be able to generate new and meaningful
thinking ..." With these words Admiral
Richard G. Colbert, in July 1968,
assumed the mantle of leadership as
President of the Naval War College.
More than a simple generalization
accompanying a change of the watch,
this initial statement formally recog
nized that the requirements for profes
sional military education had undergone
radical change in the years since World
War II.
Colbert's perceptive nature, condi
tioned by years of professional ex
perience, grasped the fact that the mili
tary officer was so conditioned to meet
the day-to-day demands of putting out
fires and meeting deadlines that he had
gotten out of the habit of sound re
search and orderly reflective thought.
Thus, it was the stimulation of these
very qualities toward which he directed
the Naval War College curriculum,
stating that "if the kind of research and
creative thinking necessary to sound
military knowledge is not done at the

War College, there is danger that it will
not be done at all."
In implementing these goals as Presi
dent, Admiral Colbert built upon the
foundations of having successfully met a
prior challenge at the college. In 1956
he organized and served as the first
director of the college's allied officer
school-the Naval Command College.
Not only have the graduates of the
Naval Command College gained recog
nition on their own merits, but the U.S.
Navy and the War College have bene
fited immeasurably through the estab
lishment of personal and professional
ties in the worldwide fraternity of naval
leaders.
The Naval Command College was,
however, but an obvious manifestation
of the particular spirit Admiral Colbert
brought to diplomacy. For him, the
field of international relations took on a
personal meaning. Long aware of the
impact that the presence of U.S. naval
forces had in affecting national policy,
he tempered his grasp of military and
political problems with an ability to
deal with people. Foreign policy was
not simply abstract statements and
docwnents; it was alive in the individ
uals with which it dealt.
The fruits of this realization took a
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OIL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Recent experience has shown that even a limited and poorly maintained Middle
Eastern oil embargo can strongly affect the eoonomi.c and temperamental well-beillg
of the United States. The potential for a future cutoff, due either to peacetime
political and economic policy or wartime jnterdiation, remains a worrisorne
contingency for American strategists. A viable counter to future threats on our

foreign oil supply is oil stockpiling, an expensive and complicated procedure, but oue
that cannot be ignored,

An article prepared

by
Barry M. Blechman and Arnold M. Kuzmack
The October 1973 war in the Middle
East finally witnessed the long threat·
ened use of the Arab uon weapon." The
major Arab oil producers-Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Iraq, the Sheikhdoms on the
Persian Gulf, Algeria, and Libya-all
embargoed shipments of their oil to the
United States. The embargo was de•
signed to curtail U.S. military, eco
nomic, and diplomatic support for Israel
and to cause this nation to force Israel
to return to the pre-1967 cease-fire
lines. Additionally, the Arab oil pro
ducing states announced progressive cut
backs in total oil production. Beginning
in October, crude oil output was to be
reduced 5 percent per month from the
level obtained in September 1973. This
step would mainly affect Europe and
Japan-the major consumers of Arab
oil-which, it was expected:

• made it certain that those nations
would not provide any support for
Israel;
• made it more difficult for the
United States to receive Arab oil in
directly; and
• put pressure on the United States
from these important sources to accede
to the Arabs' demands.
The production cutback was a short
lived policy. The December reduction
was canceled and output has since risen,
although it seems unlikely to return to
prewar levels for some time. Also, the
production cutback was never a unified
policy maneuver; Iraq, for one, flatly
declined to go along. The embargo was
sustained longer and more uniformly
and continued in effect until March
1974. However, neither of these actions
have attained their stated ends. The
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A predominant professional concern

of midcareer naval

officers at the Naval

War

College is personnel management under changing societal conditions. While it is
generally agreed that the military has to change its way of doing business to cope
with changes in society, there is far less agreement on methods and future military
standards. However, both the diversity of opinion and spirit of inquiry expressed by
these officers show a genuine interest in "why are we what we are?"-in contrast to
the stereotype image of the rigid "military mind."

REFLECTIONS ON THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION
Au article prepared
by
Professor Francis J. Wesl, Jr.
of the Dcparlmcnl of Management
U.S. Naval War College
Whether the public chooses to em
It is almost a truism to observe that
phasize the positive or negative aspects
the American public is ambivalent in its
of the military, such is affected by a
feelings toward the U.S. military as an
host of interdependent factors, in
organization. On the one hand, within
cluding warfighting performance, media
the strong American tradition of politi
coverage, international crises, and the
cal liberalism the military symbolizes
like. One thing is clear: the public's
state control and the loss of personal
image of the military does fluctuate
freedom, On the other hand, the mili
significantly and is given substantial
tary exists to defend freedom, as in
attention by the press.
World War II. It is clear that the public
One might also speculate, however,
in general regards the military as more
than just a necessary evil. While the
on how the military views itself, with
military does exhibit instances of bun
Vietnam in the past and the environ
ment of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF)
gling, waste, arrogance, and irrespon
sibility 1 it also sets national examples of
in the present. What follows are perspec
courage, asceticism, selflessness, and
tives on the military as an institution
devotion to duty. These latter traits,
drawn from extensive conversations
with and the written responses of
despite counterculture claims to the
numerous officers in the grades of lieu
contrary, are admired by the Nation as a
tenant commander through captain
whole. We all need heroes as exemplars,
both in terms of organizational efficien
(equivalent for other services) at the
Naval War College. Sixty percent were
cies and personal accomplishments.
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Navies are more than the objective projection of a nation's maritime defense

needs, they are also culturally determined expressions of how the nation sees itself.
Pot example, the U.S. Navy persists in the image of our World War II victories with

the two•ocean navy, the aircraft carrier1 and control of the seas concept. The

ritualistic Norwegian Sea exercise is the very embodiment of this image1 an image
Jong since countered by the reality of a powerful Soviet counterforce that looks not
to the past but to the future.

TllE LEMMING COMPLEX:
RITUAL DEATH IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA
by
Captain ltoherl B. Balhmsl, U.S. Navy
of the Tactics Department, U.S. Naval War College
The recent series of articles on the
Soviet Navy by Admiral Gorshkov and
the Four Missions Concept inspired by
Admiral Zumwalt give us two different
ways of looking at a navy. Our conceit
that strategic concepts and perceptions
of vulnerability are shaped by rational
analysis is shocked into the recognition
that navies are also an expression of
cultural intuitions. The arguments for
naval power by Admirals Gorshkov and
Zumwalt provide a persuasive reminder
that there is no longer a clear strategy of
seapower.
Behind each of their arguments is the
assumption of a nearly inexhaustib)e
wealth and inventiveness, time for de·
veJopment, and a distinct vagueness
about the nature of future wars at sea.
Although based on a belief in cause
effect analysis, their arguments spring
from different philosophical systems:

the Sovlet being largely deductive, ideo•
logical 1 and not narrowly jealous about
its self-interest; while the United States
proceeds in a way that is inductive,
pragmatic, endlessly self-confident, and
driven by the demands of a 11 can-do 1 '
response. Irt each, Mahan and Clause·
witz are only faint echoes. The colonial
trade essential to by Mahan i, absent in
the one and only a halfhearted target of
the other. Clearly the game proceeds by
other rules.
The old rhetoric persists, however.
One is struck by the fact that Gorshkov
did not need Marx to bridge the gap
between the navies of Czarist and Soviet
Russia and that Zumwalt's navy cannot
abandon Mahan's ucontrol of the seas"
-·now nostalgically called '*sea control.''
While both navies intend to serve state
interests, Gorshkov deduces those di
rectly from the dynamics of history
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WHAT'S LEFT OF SALT!
Any effective strategic arms control measures must reduce the likelihood of
nuclear war as well as reduce one's own damage if war should occur. How well SALT
is able to accomplish these objectives will largely determine its future.

An article prepared
by
Dr. Richard T. Ackley
The signing of the treaty on "Limita
tion of Anti�Bailistic Missile Systems"
and the "[nterim Agreement of Certain
Measures with Respect to the Limita
tion of Strategic Offensive Arms" were
proclaimed as historic events in every
oonse of the word. A White House
statement referring to the 26 May 1972
Nixon-Brezhnev summit accords hailed
the signing as uthe first time that two
major power.a have achieved this kind of
understanding affecting their vital se
curity." The real significance of the two
agreements, however 1 is the claim that
they "enhanced the security of both
1
side.s. 11
If, in fact, one is to deal
critically with the latter statement, the
strategic national security objectives of
both the United States and the U.S.S.R.
should be tested against the terms of the
agreements, then against the strategic
balance as it has developed today.
In the broadest of terms, any effec•
tive strategic arms control measures
must reduce the likelihood of nuclear
war, as wen as reduce one's own damage

if war should occur. The point is, arms
control must contribute to national
security defense policy or it does not
make sense at all. That is, it must
enhance nuclear deterrence. provide
damage-limitation, and enhance crisis
stability-preclude a ._first-strike
bonus." More specifically, the U.S. stra
tegic policy has been widely publicized
and clearly stated over recent years.
President Nixon has said. "deterrence of
war is the primary goal of our strategic
policy and the principal function of our
2
nuclear forces. " Thus. our strategic
objectives continue to be:
• to deter all-out attack on the
United States or its allies;
• to face any potential aggressor
contemplating less than all·out attack
with unacceptable risks; and
• to maintain a stable political en
vironment within which tho threat of
aggression or coercion against the
United States or its allies is minimized. 3
U.S. strategic objectives, then, en
compass deterrence 1 assured destruc�
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Besides generating considerable politiaal and emotional impact, the recent Arab

oil embargo also highlighted the critical need for new energy sources. The ocean
floor, particularly the area of the Continental Shelf, is one potentia11y vast source of
oil energy that has been largely ignored because of limiting technology and
profitability. The high price of oil has to some degree removed the economic
constraints from offshore oil production, but political and technical problems must

still be solved if this valuable potential is to be realized.

OIL AND GAS IN THE OCEANS
A research paper prepared
by
Dr. Herman T. Franssen
position than the United States. Neither
Introduction. Petroleum consump·
has large reserves or even substantial
tion in the world has doubled during the
1 %O's and is likely to double again in
potential petroleum resources on land
and consequently are largely dependent
the period from 1970-1980. To meet
on the Middle East. These Persian Gulf
these projected demands, nations will
increasingly tum toward the last largely
States contain more than one-half of the
world's proved oil reserves, but because
untapped reservoirs of oil and gas, the
oceans. In the United States-the major
of monopolistic practices and political
oil producer among the large non
instability have been unable to guaran
Communist industrial countries-new
tee supplies at a relatively stable price.
additions to proved onshore reserves are
Japan and Europe may succeed in par
no longer the result of newly discovered
tially diversifying their sources of oil
fields but are instead caused by im·
and gas supplies through offshore de•
proved recovery techniques for already
velopment because liquid hydrocarbons
producing wells. Aside from continuing
improvements in recovery techniques,
Dr, Franssen is an Advanced Research
new fields with vast petroleum potential
Project Associate with the Department of
are likely to be found in Alaska and
Advanced l{esearch at the Nava,l War College,
This article has heen. drawn from the research
'beneath the continental margins around
project titled "Actual and Potential Conflict
the United States.
over Ocean Resouwm, Within Areas of Na
The two other major industrial giants
tional and Limited National Jurisdiction as
in the Western World, Western Europe
Proposed for the Third Law of the Sea
and Japan, are in a far less enviable
Conference,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol27/iss3/20
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Racism, male chauvanism, and the generation gap are three facets of a broad

problem facing naval management under the general heading of minority-majority

group relations. With the advent of the all-volunteer force, the military has found it
increasingly important to identify wJth the humanistic aspirations of its people. How
well the Navy can deal with these questions will have a grave impact on the service
and will ultimately determine the future of the zero draft.

UNDERSTANDING RACE RELATIONS
AS AN ASPECT OF
THE MANAGEMENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL l
A leclnre delivered in the Defense l•:conomics
and Decisionmaking t:urriculum al the Naval War t:ollege
by
Ur. Lawrnnce Podell
No other major segment of American
society has dealt with institutional racial
segregation with the swiftness and
thoroughness of the military. Dis•

criminatory practices in industry, com

merce, schools, colleges1 and housing

continue today on a far larger scale and
with much greater persistence than in
the armed services. Some knowledge of
these facts is essential if one is to
properly describe and assess today's
military race problem. However, tradi
tional aspects of race relations in
America, those most often corrected by
"official" action as with the Navy, have
in some measure been superseded by the
new attitudinal problems of black con·
sciousness and white backlash. Com·
manders, the field managers of military
personnel, must understand these phe
nomena if they are to accomplish their
mission.

Racial equality became an issue for
the United States, and particularly for
the military, with the Emancipation
Proclamation. Much has happened since
that time, and a broad review of service
racial policies should be of some benefit
in understanding present-day problems.
During the Civil War, the Union Army
included 180,000 blacks serving in
white·officered segregated regiments.
After the war, four Regular Army Negro
regiments policed the Western frontier
and battled Indian tribes; some of these
fought in Cuba during the war with
Spain. In World War I the combat
performance of all·Negro units was
mixed, with the 92d Infantry Division
coming under particular criticism. After
World War I the racially segregated
Army imposed a Negro quota. Designed
to equal the 9.8 percent proportion of
blacks in the U.S. population, at the
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"Pencil pushing 1 ' was once an ac•
tivity thought to occupy the time of
shore duty officers only, but over the
years the operating manager afloat has
found his time increasingly preempted
by reporting requirements1 often at the
expense of essential combat readiness
functions. If the proliferation of these
time consuming and expensive reports is
to be arrssted, a sound admim'strative
reports control system should be em
ployed that emphasizes the costs of
information, the principles of exception
reporting, .and sample theory.

REPORTS
OR
READINESS:
A DILEMMA

A paper prepared for the course in Defense Economics
and Decisionmaking at the Naval War College
hy
Lieutenant Commander Thomas S. Tollefsen, U.S. Navy
lnlroduclion

Life at sea is a high adventure. The
few young Americans who still go down
to the sea in ships are usually rugged
and outspoken in their own element.
Seamen have traditionally enjoyed a
high degree of tolerance coupled with a
keen sense of justice. As a kinetic group,
they respect authority and willingly
follow the precepts of their shorebound
superiors. This authority1 however,
when it is abused or unreasonable,
inculcates a spirit of disregard by the
men who man the fleet ships. 1 In
dividualism remains a keystone and an
essential ingredient of most effective
navies, and the constraining ship admin�
istrative reports system presently in
effect in our own Navy has proven to be
a catalyst for resentment by fleet

officers. Indeed, the cancerous growth
of a cumbersome, often redundant re
porting system has led many of the 90
percent of the surface junior officers
who leave the fleet at their first oppor
tunity to list the onerous administrative
burden as a principal complaint, Neither
is it inexplicable that career surface
warfare officers in the full vigor of their
professional careers seek opportunities
ashore to avoid the administrative
liability of senior shipboard positions,
To command a surface combatant
was once a challenge and an adventure;
but the administrative burden of com•
mand has so mushroomed that even a
return to homeport is frequently
dreaded as the prelude to yet another
recurring reporting requirement. In the
2-year period from I 971 through 1973,
the fleet ships experienced a 38 percent
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PACIFISTS
AND
PEACEMAKERS
An arlicl" prnparnd
by
Captain Wayne P. Huglu,s, Jr., U.S. Navy
Some of my good Christian friends
are pacifists. I have struggled to per
suade them that the heart of the Chris•
tian message is not that war brings evil
but that evil brings war. Treating the
symptom will not keep the disease from
flourishing.
They have not boon receptive to any
view other than that war is intolerable.
Being reluctant observers of our na·
tional participation in a decade of nasty,
frustrating, killing war, they see the
obvious: that war does generate pain
and suffering. They set aside the possi•
bility that a world without armies could
also be intolerably chaotic, avaricious,
and cruel.
Some of my pacifist friends deplore
only aggressive war. Others hold that
any fighting, even in self,defense, is
wrong. The Christ taught us we must
turn the other cheek. "Blessed are the
peacemakers," He said. They promote
unilateral disarmament and national re•
nunciation of war. They are quite pre�
pared to endure privation, like Mahatma
Gandhi, in a noble cause. Paradoxically,
their methods, unlike Gandhi 1s1 can be
downright militant. As we saw in the
late l %O's, pacifists seem to attract,
and accept, those who draw the line at

Most of mankind demonstrates an
ambiguity toward war. Subscribing to
platitudes for peace, we are profoundly
skeptical that pacifism is practical. We
argue vigorously for the "right of self
defense1 JJ with deliberate vagueness
about what that means. We have a deep
uneasiness that the idea of pacifism -of
a refusal to fight back no matter what
the provocation-is somehow unnatural.
The more simple and childlike the man,
the more he works with his hands, with
the earth, and with the beasts of the
earth, the more quickly he accepts
violence as part oflife. The Thoreau, of
the world seem to most of us to be the
exception that proves the rule.
Anthropologists rage in a debate over
whether man descended from an aggres•
sive ancestor who cheerfully fought to
survive in an uncharitable world or, a la
Rousseau, derived from a gentle, peace
fut ancestor whom society corrupted.
The answer determines how one views
the primary purpose of government: it
can be to constrain an essentially com
bative mankind or it can be to promote
the betterment of our fellow man. The
former would organize police and
armies but eschew social programs as an
avoidable concentration of power in the
hands of the corruptible; the latter
no excess except killing.
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HERE'S TO GROG!
An article 11rnpared
by
Commander J.R. Tappan, U.S. Navy
1

'What do you do wfth a drunken sailor

early-y�y-y in the mornin'?"

Grog.
traditional wetting-down parties, drink
The seafarer 1s drink of song and
ing the dolphins, beer busts, wine
chantey. Our traditional beverage.
tasting nights, vodka blizzards, initia
But grog is more than sea-spray 1 sails,
tions, mess nights, Friday noon liquid
and swords, Grog is also alcohol.
lunches:1 champagne brunches, "muster
And what do we do with the
ing'' at the O'Club or the Chief's Club,
drunken sailor-the pilot, FBM fire
hard-to-refuse prices at the package
control technician, chief ordnanceman,
store, and our happy, happy (happy?)
doctor, snipe, admiral, messcook 1 para·
hours . , . ? That must be it.
chute rigger ... ?
Because, of course, you don't have a
You may begin to sense that there is
problem, and besides ...
no intention of hoisting any tankards
here. Even s:0 1 maybe you have a Per•
sonal reason for reading this.
In this article the author makes a gut plea
Is it because you have an uneasy
for Navy management to deal with a problem
feeling that the Navy i, dependent on
that is causing extravagant waste in term& of
alcohol�is an alcohol pusher?
people and dollars, The article is a popu
Is it because your skipper i your exec,
larized version of an e><:haustive research
project by Commander Tappan conducted
your department head, your division
under the auspices of the college's advanced
chief, petty officer, leading seaman, or
research pl'ogram. The project is titled "Pre
the new recruit has caused you trouble
vention of Alcoholism and Other Drinking
at one time or another when he or she
Problems in the U,S, Navy"; copies of this
could not ' 1handle 0 the booze? Or,
study are available from the Chief of Naval
Personnel (ATT: Pers 6cl5), Navy Depart
closer to home, is it because booze is
ment, Washington, D.C. 20350 (autovon
moving in on your mother, sister,
222-1210), The author wishes to acknowledge
brother, wife, daughter 1 or your son?
the valuah1e advioo and assistance given by
Or are you reading this because the
Mr. Bernard Donohue in the prepar�tion of
title made you feel good about our
this article.
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NEWPORT: THOSE WERE THE DAYS
"It is a great misfortune that our
military schools should be established in
connection with the watering places
characterized ...in scenes of social dis
play and dissipation. Surely the students
will be wasted ... on the giddy maidens
who disport themselves on the rocks in
sunbonnets!" These were the words of
Congressman William McAdoo as he
described the relationship between New
port and the Naval War College in 1892.
In 1974, though giddy maidens no
longer wear sunbonnets and the social
display is less conspicuous, Newport
still offers a wide variety of entertain
ment and cultural activities for the
family and enterprising bachelor.

Historic Newport, one of the key
cities in the upcoming bicentennial
celebration, also boasts over 300 pre
Revolutionary War buildings, more than
any city in the United States. The old
homes and public buildings, combined
with the narrow streets (designed for
horse traffic and often a challenge for
horseless carriages) create an 18th cen
tury seaport atmosphere. Where else, for
example, could a visitor dine in an 18th
century tavern on fine local cuisine, step
outside and see a waterfront filled with
square-riggers and the finest sailing ships
on the east coast ? Numerous buildings
have been restored to their colonial
state by private owners or local organi-

"The Colony House," one of the rare early government buildings of America 11739)
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